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We study the stochastic dynamics of coupled states with transition probabilities depending on
local persistence, this is, the time since a state has changed. When the population has a preference to
adopt older states the system orders quickly due to the dominance of the old state. When preference
for new states prevails, the system can show coexistence of states or synchronized collective behavior
resulting in long ordering times. In this case, the magnetization m(t) of the system oscillates around
m(t) = 0. Implications for social systems are discussed.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Cc, 89.20.-a, 89.75.-k, 05.40.-a
Models of two states are commonly used in physics as
a tool to study the emergence of collective behavior in
systems from spin interaction to opinion dynamics [1–
3]. In the adoption of traits [4–7] different aspects have
been studied including the relevance of the interaction
topology [8–10], social influence [11, 12], and mass media
[13–15]. When accounting for opinion dynamics, the ma-
jority of models are based on decision rules that consider
a fraction of the surrounding states, e.g., voter model
[16], threshold model [17], majority rule [18], or Sznajd
model [19]. The timing of the interactions can also af-
fect the behavior of the system at least by two ways:
the precise sequence of interactions and by the aging of
states. For example, in epidemic spreading and diffusion,
the temporal sequence of interactions can slow down the
spreading process [20–23]; in ordering dynamics, state-
dependent updates can have a qualitative impact on the
mean time to order [24–29]. Aging in physical systems
refers to the persistence time, that is, the time spent in a
given state, and affects the response of the system to an
external field or perturbation [30, 31]. In social systems,
when individuals make choices they usually relay on their
own past experience or memory [32–34]. While conser-
vative groups tend to hold ideas in an unaltered form for
a long time, progressive individuals embrace new opin-
ions, ideas, or a technology and disseminate them with
more enthusiasm [35, 36]. In the competition between
new and old information, although new information is
more valuable for exploring and spatial searching [37],
adopting older strategies can promote cooperation and
group success [38]. Also in a biological context, aging in
speciation events has been proposed as a mechanism to
explain the shape of evolutionary trees [39].
Here we analyze how the tendency of agents towards
the adoption of established vs. novel traits influences
the macroscopic dynamic and the ordering process. We
tackle this problem by considering a model in which the
adoption of states depends on the time span the agents
have held their current states.
The model is defined as follows: each agent has a state
l that can be up (↑) or down (↓) with age young (y) or old
(z). Agents can be then in four states y↑, y↓, z↑, and z↓.
Young agents become old at a rate that we set to r = 1.
Then, there are reactions of randomly paired agents: i)
in young i and old j of opposite opinions, i adopts the
opinion of j with probability w = 12 + , otherwise (with
probability 1− w), j adopts the opinion of i; ii) in pairs
of agents with the same age and different opinion, each
agent has probability 12 of convincing the other; iii) for
pairs of agents with the same opinion, nothing happens.
When an agent adopts an opinion, it goes to the young
age of the adopted opinion. Neglecting correlations, the
expectation values of state concentrations evolve accord-
ing to
y˙↑ = −y↑ + (1− 2w)y↑z↓ + wy↓z↑ + 12z↑z↓ ,
y˙↓ = −y↓ + wy↑z↓ + (1− 2w)y↓z↑ + 12z↑z↓ ,
z˙↑ = y↑ − (1− w)y↓z↑ − 12z↑z↓ ,
z˙↓ = y↓ − (1− w)y↑z↓ − 12z↑z↓ ,
(1)
with the normalization y↑+y↓+z↑+z↓ = 1. Here we use
y↑↓ and z↑↓ to refer to the fraction of the corresponding
states occupied by the agents. The parameter  corre-
sponds to the persuasiveness of the agent,  > 0 means
that agents with older opinions are more persuasive. On
the contrary,  < 0 corresponds to agents with younger
opinions been more persuasive.
The system presents three stationary solutions in the
relevant range of all four variables being non-negative.
Two fixed points are the homogeneous solutions S1 hav-
ing z↓ = 1 and S2 having z↑ = 1. Here either all opinions
are down (S1) or all are up (S2) and old. The homoge-
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FIG. 1. Eigenvalues of the stationary solutions of Eq. (1)
as a function of persuasiveness  for: (a) the homogeneous
solutions S1 and S2 having the same eigenvalues, and (b)
the solution S3. Black solid (gray dashed) lines represent
real (imaginary) parts of the two complex conjugate eigenval-
ues. Doted-dashed black line represent the third eigenvalue
(real). The fourth eigenvalue (not shown) for the eigenspace
in (1, 1, 1, 1) direction is zero due to conservation of normal-
ization.
neous solutions are stable if  > 0. Non-zero imaginary
parts of two eigenvalues are obtained for  > 1/4. The
third fixed point S3 is an up-down-symmetric solution
with values y↑ = y↓ = 5+2−∆8 , z
↑ = z↓ = −5+2+∆8
where ∆ =
√
25 + 4(2 + 3). As shown in Figure 1(b),
it is stable if  < 0, thus complementary to the stabil-
ity of the homogeneous solutions. A transition from zero
to non-zero imaginary parts of two eigenvalues occurs
when  falls below approximately −0.39. In this regime
of strongly negative , the system oscillates when relax-
ing from a perturbation out of the symmetric fixed point
solution S3. This stability scenario is qualitatively main-
tained when r changes. As r → 0, the point at which
the non-zero imaginary part of the eigenvalues shows up
shifts towards  = 0.
Model with continuous ages. We now move from two
ages to a continuous age space and introduce an age de-
pendent probability. The model is now described as fol-
lows. Agents can be in one of the two opinions, up or
down. The state of each agent has associated an age de-
fined as: τi = t− ti, where t is the current time and ti is
the time when the current state of agent i was acquired.
The system evolves by randomly selecting a pair of agents
that, if they are in different states, with probability pi→j
agent agent j adopts the state of agent i, and with prob-
ability 1−pi→j the contrary happens i copies the state of
j. If the agents are already in the same state, no change
is applied. After N updates, time t is increased to t+ 1.
We define the probability pi→j to be dependent on the
age of the states of both interacting agents as
pi→j =
1
1 + (τj/τi)α
. (2)
Initially, each agent has randomly assigned one of the
two opinions and the initial ages ti are uniformly dis-
tributed proportionally to the system size N . We con-
sider random mixing where each agent is allowed to in-
teract with any other agent. The case α = 0 corresponds
to an updating probability of pi→j = 0.5 which leads to
voter model dynamics [16]. Large values of the exponent
(α → ∞), correspond to situations in which the agent
with the initial oldest state is imposing her opinion to
the others. In the other extreme case (α → −∞), the
youngest state is imposed.
For α→∞ the system ends up in the state of the old-
est opinion while for values of α ∈ (−∞, 0] the system
adopts any of the two opinions with equal probability.
For α ∈ (0,∞) the probability that the system adopts
the state of the initial oldest opinion grows with increas-
ing α but it tends to 1/2 when N increases.
Figure 2 shows the probability distribution function of
the density of states ρ as a function of α. For α = 0,
the density of states is homogeneous corresponding to
an equiprobable distribution of states. For α negative
but close to zero, the dynamic is concentrated around
ρ = 0.5, which corresponds to a configuration where
the agents alternate between any of the two opinions.
This situation changes gradually to a more homogeneous
distribution of states as α becomes more negative. For
α > 0, the states are concentrated around ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1 showing that the system eventually orders in one
of the two opinions (the presence of the two peaks is due
to the alternation in being the oldest opinion during the
initial conditions).
Figure 3 shows the ordering time SN (α), i.e., the time
that the system needs to reach a final state where all the
agents have the same opinion, computed as the median
of the distribution of ordering times from different sim-
ulations and rescaled to the value SN (α = 0). SN (0)
increases linearly with the N as it does for the voter
model [9, 40]. For values α > 0, SN (α) gets smaller than
SN (0) implying that the system orders faster than in the
voter model case. There is a transition when α crosses
zero. For values α . 0, SN (α) increases very fast with N .
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FIG. 2. Probability density function (codified as a colormap)
of the dependence of the density of states with α. The den-
sity of states is calculated by computing the normalized cu-
mulative histogram of the fraction of population in each state
during a fixed simulation period and averaged over 104 real-
izations. The system size was fixed to N = 100.
This is in agreement with the observed dynamics around
α = −1 (see Fig. 2). The extreme values of α correspond
to the cases where, when confronting two states, the old-
est opinion always induces the change (α = +∞) or the
youngest opinion always induces the change (α = −∞).
The inset of Fig 3 shows the scaling with system size of
SN (α) in these limits. For α = +∞ the ordering time
scales as SN ∼ Nγ with the exponent γ = 1.2. In the
other limit, for α = −∞, the ordering time scales as
SN ∼ N exp(bN) with b = 0.009.
In the regime α < 0, what is the behaviour of the sys-
tem during the long ordering times? Figure 4(a) shows
time series of the magnetization of the system. For α
negative and sufficiently far from zero, the magnetiza-
tion oscillates around zero. Figure 4(b) provides further
analysis by the autocorrelation functions of the magne-
tization time series. The onset of oscillations is observed
when α passes a value around −0.5 from above. Fig-
ure 4(c) shows frequency ω and decay constant γ ex-
tracted from the autocorrelation functions. These values
do not exhibit significant dependence on system size. The
decay constant is maximum at the onset of oscillations,
i.e. where the frequency ω becomes non-zero. Both the
onset of oscillations and the decay behaviour are captured
by the basic model, cf. Figure 1(b). At the transition
to non-zero imaginary parts (oscillations), the stability
of the symmetric fixed point solution (S3) is maximal,
meaning that perturbations decay fastest.
To understand further the dynamic around α = 0
we define a quantity called the convincingness z. Let
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FIG. 3. Rescaled ordering time SN (α)/SN (0) versus α for
different system sizes. Open symbols stand for the median of
the ordering time normalized to the median of the ordering
time at α = 0. The horizontal black line has been added for
visualization purposes. Inset: Scaling of the median of SN (α)
in the limits α → ∞ (solid symbols) and α → −∞ (open
symbols). Dashed lines fit respectively SN (+∞) ∼ Nγ with
γ = 1.2 and SN (−∞) ∼ N exp(bN) with b = 0.009.
9580 9600 9620 9640 9660 9680 9700 9720
time
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
m
ag
ne
tiz
at
io
n 
m
(t) α = −0.05
α = −5.00
0 10 20 30 40 50
delay time τ
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
of
 m
ag
ne
tiz
at
io
n
α = −0.05
α = −0.50
α = −5.00
0.01 0.1 1 10
model parameter -α
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
o
sc
ill
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
 ω
,
 
de
ca
y 
co
ef
f. 
γ N = 10000
N = 20000
N = 50000
(a)
(b) (c)
FIG. 4. Oscillations and decay of correlations for the finite-
size model in the regime α < 0. (a) Excerpts from time series
of the magnetization for two different values of α, system size
N = 50000. (b) Autocorrelation functions from magnetiza-
tion time series of length T = 105, system size N = 50000. (c)
Oscillation frequency ω (curves with symbols) and decay co-
efficients γ (no symbols) extracted from time series under dif-
ferent values of α and N . Curves for different system sizes N
are almost indistinguishable. Autocorrelation functions A(τ),
τ ∈ [0, 100], are considered for a least squares fit of the func-
tional form Afit(t) = exp(−γt) cos(ωt).
4S+, S− ∈ [N ] be the two sets of agents with equal opin-
ion within each set and different opinions across sets. We
define the convincingness of S+ vs. S− as the probability
z that the interaction of a uniformly random pair of an
S+ agent and an S− agent leads to adoption of the S+
opinion,
z = |S+|−1|S−|−1
∑
i∈S+
∑
j∈S−
ταi
ταi + τ
α
j
. (3)
In case α < 0, there are competing effects governing the
dynamics of z. When i ∈ S+ convinces j ∈ S−, i) the
set S+ gains another member who now has the youngest
opinion increasing z. ii) The set S− loses a member j
with τj typically larger than average, making opinions of
S− members younger on average decreasing z. iii) With
time advancing, all opinions age by the same additive
rate. This makes ratios between ages smaller, driving z
towards 1/2. In the case α  −1, the first effect dom-
inates. Thus, an initial advantage in z is amplified and
the system orders quickly. For α ≈ −1, ordering times
are large due to dominance of the second and third ef-
fects. In order to verify this idea, we numerically record
data pairs (z(t), z(t + τ) − z(t)) with τ = 1. Averaging
over pairs with the same or similar z(t) values, we ob-
tain 〈z(t+τ)−z(t)〉 as the expected restoring force. The
corresponding standard deviation is the noise strength at
this z value. The restoring force for z is linear around
the equilibrium point z(t) = 0.5 while the noise strength
is mostly independent of z (see Fig. 1 at Supplemental
Material). This suggests to picture the dynamics around
α = 0 as one-dimensional equilibrium in a hyperbolic
potential under state-independent additive noise.
Different real systems display dominance such as in
the adoption of innovations [4, 5] and alternation as in
opinion formation dynamics [41–43] or economic cycles
[44]. As an example, Fig. 5 shows the electoral results
of the governmental elections for United States, United
Kingdom, and Canada during several decades [45]. The
Lomb periodogram [46] of the binary time series reveals
the existence of alternation between the political par-
ties, by the presence of prominent peaks well above the
noise level (shuffling of the data), with periods of 20−30
years in agreement with observations [47]. This period of
time coincides approximately with the length of a gen-
eration. Different mechanisms have been proposed to
explain political cycles: electorate disappointment [48],
voters mood changes [47, 49], negativity effect [50] or
policy inertia [51]. Our study complements those mech-
anisms and contributes to understand how a continuous
age state dynamics model with competition between pref-
erence for old versus young opinions leads to alternation
in the leading opinion.
Summarizing, we have studied the competition of
states using a basic model that takes into account the
aging of the state. The stability analysis of the solutions
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FIG. 5. Election results for United States, United King-
dom, and Canada. Elected parties are represented by their
official colors, USA: Republicans (red) and Democrats (blue);
UK: Conservative (blue), Liberals (yellow), and Labour (red);
Canada: Liberals (red), Unionist (gray), and Conservatives
(blue). Bottom panel: Lomb periodograms of the binary time
series for each country. Dashed lines represents the level of
noise as the result of shuffling the data 250 times.
reveals the existence of two stable solutions for positive
values of the persuasiveness (old opinion prevails) that
compete for consensus. For large negative persuasive-
ness (young opinion prevails), only one solution is stable
leading to oscillatory transients. We have extended our
study to a more detailed continuous age model finding
that, when confronting two opinions, the final config-
uration where only one opinion survives and the time
needed to reach it is noticeably sensitive to the age of
the state through the exponent α of the convincing prob-
ability. The continuous age model exhibits likewise the
oscillations shown by the basic model for large negative
persuasiveness as well as similar solutions with α. Our
study provides an alternative mechanism in the under-
standing of the dynamics of consensus formation and the
observed alternation between states of different systems.
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